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THE VISIBLE HAND OF THE STATE:
ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OF INTEREST GROUPS
BERT FRAUSSEN
To understand dynamics within communities of organized interests, researchers have primarily
studied organizational births and deaths. The organizational development of established interest
organizations has received far less attention. This article claims that the evolution of interest groups’
organizational features is strongly affected by evolving resource dependencies with the state. A life-
history case study of an environmental interest organization is used to substantiate this argument
empirically. The findings demonstrate that resource dependence relations with state actors critically
shape organizational development, but that this dependence affects an organization’s mission,
structure, and strategy in different ways. This conclusion highlights the vital role of government
patronage in the survival and maintenance of interest organizations.
INTRODUCTION
To facilitate the representation of particular interests and mitigate the ‘upper-class accent’,
public authorities often support organized interests that represent constituencies or causes
which would otherwise remain unheard (Walker 1991; Baumgartner and Leech 1998).
Policymakers may actively seek support from a visible and well-organized constituency, as
such backing can be critical to policy development and coherence, especially in emerging
or less salient policy domains (May et al. 2005; Jordan and Halpin 2006; Poppelaars 2007;
Halpin et al. 2011). By supporting particular interest organizations, governments seek
to increase their legitimacy and to build a more vibrant civil society (Mahoney and
Beckstrand 2011). The fact that contemporary policymakers are keen to develop close ties
with organized interests fits into a general shift towards network governance, which is
marked by a greater involvement of non-governmental organizations in public policy
(Salamon 2002; Lewis 2011).
Much research in this area has focused on non-profit organizations (Froelich 1999; Stone
et al. 2001; Nikolic and Koontz 2008; Suarez 2011; Mosley 2012; Verschuere and De Corte
2012). It demonstrates how relations with public authorities enable professionalization by
offering a more stable funding source, yet also increase bureaucratization and possibly
reduce an organization’s autonomy and responsiveness to societal needs. By exploring
the organizational implications of these evolving ties on the development of organized
interests, this article aims to increase our understanding of why ‘some organizations adapt
readily to every environmental challenge, whereas others succumb to the first traumatic
event they face’ (Aldrich and Ruef 2006, p. 13; see also Wilson 1974).
By supporting particular interest organizations, policymakers can considerably increase
an organization’s financial resources, legitimacy, and chances of survival. However, such
patronage is usually conditional on specific organizational features and activities, which
in turn shapes the further development of these organizations (Elbers and Arts 2011;
Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011). Moreover, the interaction between public authorities
and organized interests should not be depicted as static. It changes over time as a result
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of governments altering their approach towards interest organizations, for instance by
involving them in policy formulation, the implementation of policy programmes or the
education of their constituency (Jordan and Halpin 2003; Christiansen et al. 2010; Halpin
et al. 2011).
These evolving resource dependencies between governments and organized interests,
however, do not affect all organizational features equally. Peripheral features of an
organization, such as its strategies, are generally considered more flexible than core
characteristics like an organization’s mission (Halpin and Nownes 2011), and thus are
more likely to be affected by the interaction with public authorities. Eventually, the
development of these core and peripheral features, which represent vital components of
an organization’s embeddedness, will also shape organizational behaviour and strategies
(Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Eising 2007).
By conceptualizing the development of organized interests as evolving resource depen-
dencies with public authorities, this article underlines the role of government patronage.
After discussing the existing literature, resource dependence theory is introduced as a
tool to conceptualize these relations between the state and organized interests. It is argued
that components of an organization are affected in different ways by these evolving
resource dependencies, as structural and especially strategic features are more prone to
change than an organization’s mission. Subsequently, a life-history case study of a central
Flemish environmental peak association, the Federation for a Better Environment (Bond
Beter Leefmilieu, BBL), empirically demonstrates the link between organizational dynamics
and political-institutional developments.
These observations have important implications for our understanding of organizational
survival and maintenance, as well as broader community dynamics (Toke 2010). In the
long run, evolving ties with public authorities may alter the resource distribution among
organized interests and their position within policy networks, changing the political
context and possibly causing different policy outcomes. Still, while government patronage
frequently enables the accumulation of organizational capabilities, these dependencies
need to be carefully managed by organized interests, so that their development remains
aligned with their initial mission.
LOOKING BEYOND NUMBERS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
To understand the evolving demographics of organizations, three processes should be
taken into account: foundings, disbandings, and organizational change (Aldrich and
Ruef 2006). Much research on populations of interest organizations, however, has mainly
focused on the first two processes, thus examining births and deaths (Lowery and
Gray 1995; Nownes 2010). Population ecology, for instance, conceives of organizations
as structurally inert and consequently considers foundings and disbandings as the
fundamental mechanisms shaping demographics (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Scholars
applying this framework have identified the great potential of members and financial
resources as critical conditions for survival (Gray and Lowery 1996). The acquisition
and accumulation of these critical capabilities, such as financial leverage and a highly
educated staff, is also considered imperative for effective advocacy (Andrews and Caren
2010; Klu¨ver 2012). These findings echo the liability of smallness argument, the idea that
larger organizations are better equipped to deal with environmental challenges, and thus
demonstrate the critical importance of organizational development (Hirschman 1970;
Minkoff 1999; Aldrich 2008, p. 21).
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Nevertheless, while the evolving carrying capacity of a particular field can explain
growth or decline in organizational density, the development of individual interest
organizations may vary substantially, as ‘high-level trends do not impact uniformly in
particular cases’ (Halpin and Jordan 2009, p. 246). For instance, in their study of the peace,
women’s, and environmental movements, Soule and King (2008) found that the effects
of sectoral competition varied depending on the specific nature of the organization. As a
result, organizational development is believed to be ‘far more complex and multivalent
than the ‘‘populate or perish’’ approach’, which does not reveal how interest organizations
manage to survive (Halpin and Jordan 2009, pp. 264–65; Halpin and Nownes 2011).
Some authors have even argued that organizations are ‘always changing’, as they are
continuously extrapolating past trends and responding to volatile environments, for better
or worse (Miller and Friesen 1980; March 1981; Minkoff 1999). Accordingly, theoretical
perspectives that take into account variation across existing organizations, within sectors
as well as over time, can significantly complement our understanding of organizational
development (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Astley and Van de Ven
1983, p. 246; Child 1997). Accounting for continuity and change, rather than juxtaposing
inert and dynamic organizations, these perspectives focus on ‘how often they change, to
what extent, and under which conditions’ (Aldrich and Ruef 2006, p. 13). By zooming
in on organizational development, we can clarify how interest organizations accumulate
resources and strengthen their position in policy networks, as well as explain why some
of them manage to survive and become important political actors.
Whereas the research on the professionalization of organized interests frequently
provides detailed descriptions of intra-organizational characteristics, it is generally less
attentive to the dynamic relations between interest organizations and state actors (Putnam
1995; Jordan and Maloney 1997; Skocpol 2003; Maloney 2009). In contrast, social movement
and certain interest organization scholars have frequently explored how social movements
gradually become more closely connected with the state and how they evolve from a
confrontation and protest style to a more consensual style (Grant 1978; Staggenborg 1988;
Walgrave 1994; Clemens 1997; Minkoff 1999; Jordan and Halpin 2003). Still, relations with
state actors also strongly affect the development of organized interests.
In recent years, scholars have frequently applied resource dependence theory in
order to conceptualize relations between organized interests and public authorities,
demonstrating, for instance, that policymakers grant access to organized interests in
return for expertise and the legitimization of policy proposals (Bouwen 2002; Beyers and
Kerremans 2007; Eising 2007; Poppelaars 2007; Braun 2012). However, such exchanges
have implications that go beyond the gaining and granting of access. Research has
demonstrated that a large proportion of organized interests is highly dependent on state
support (Skocpol 2003; Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011).
By offering financial resources and legal recognition to interest organizations, public
authorities enhance the latter’s chances of survival and shape their development through
formal and informal pressures (see also DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Considering that
the development of organized interests is strongly affected by the need to maintain their
organization (Salisbury 1969; Lowery 2007), the importance of (successful) lobbying to
organizational survival should not be overstated. For this reason, it is not so surprising
that ‘groups [choose] venues not only to advance substantive policy goals, but also to
serve organizational needs and identities’ (Pralle 2003, p. 234), nor is it remarkable that
concerns related to the security, survival, and growth of interest organizations frequently
trump ideological consistency (Staggenborg 1988, p. 383; Mosley 2012).
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DEVELOPING FOR SURVIVAL: RESOURCE DEPENDENCIES
AND THE HIERARCHY OF CHANGE
Organizational development usually occurs in a path dependent, incremental fashion,
as initial choices regarding structure and strategy often have long-lasting effects
(Stinchcombe 1965; Edwards and McCarthy 2004, p. 136). Still, not all aspects of an
organization’s configuration are equally amenable to change. As a result, some features
of organizations will be more heavily affected by changing resource dependencies
with public authorities. In their seminal article, Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 156)
conceptualize organizational structures as ‘composed of hierarchical layers of structural
and strategic features that vary systematically in flexibility and responsiveness’. They
distinguish between core and peripheral features, the latter being more prone to change
as the organization grows, or when its competitive or institutional environment is
altered. Whereas changes in core features are often followed by the adjustment of
peripheral ones, the reverse does not hold. Research on the behaviour of non-profit
organizations has confirmed this proposition: altering dependencies had a great
impact on organizational decisions regarding target groups and outputs, yet it did
not change missions and goals (Nikolic and Koontz 2008, p. 460; Verschuere and De
Corte 2012, p. 13).
Applying these insights to organized interests, a distinction is made between an
organization’s mission, structure, and strategy. Its mission, which relates to representing a
certain constituency or supporting a particular cause, is considered a core feature. While
an organization might take a less radical stance in order to gain access to policymakers, a
substantial change in its mission rarely materializes (Jordan and Halpin 2003). Research
on non-profit organizations has demonstrated that, even when faced with ‘distractions of
resource acquisition’, they tend to hold on to their mission and are ‘powerfully guided by
organizational history, norms, leadership and culture’ (Froelich 1999, pp. 263–64).
In contrast, strategic features, such as an organization’s network and issue portfolio, are
considered peripheral characteristics and are thus more dynamic, as they relate to an
organization’s interaction with its environment. This strategic flexibility is confirmed by
the issue-specific nature of lobbying patterns (Smith 2000; Baumgartner et al. 2009). In
particular, resourceful interest organizations can easily form ad hoc coalitions, or switch
between access points (Kriesi and Tresch 2007). Their policy portfolio, which reflects how
their mission is translated into political action, can also be more easily adjusted (Browne
1990; Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Johnson 2006). Consequently, these strategic features
are more likely to evolve as resource dependencies with public authorities change.
Finally, an organization’s structure, such as its membership, staff, and financial
resources, is conceived of as less flexible than its strategic features. The type of mem-
bership is generally determined in the formative years of the organization and changes
only gradually afterwards. The total amount of human capital and the financial means of
the organization can nonetheless vary considerably over time, as exchange relations with
public authorities are loosened or intensified. Therefore, compared to the mission of an
organization, these structural features are believed to be more adaptable.
In the next section, this argument is illustrated by analysing the development of one of
the main Flemish environmental interest organizations, the BBL. Rather than examining
patterns of foundings and disbandings within a particular policy field, the life-history of
a single interest organization is examined, relating the evolution of their organizational
features to changing resource dependencies with public authorities. In this regard, three
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phases are distinguished, enabling a within-case longitudinal comparison of the impact
of the changing dependencies on the organization’s mission, structure, and strategy.
HOW STATE RELATIONS SHAPE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF THE FEDERATION FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT
Founded in 1971, the BBL today unites more than 140 environmental interest orga-
nizations. It has acquired ‘a privileged role’ as the main interlocutor of the Flemish
government concerning environmental affairs (Bursens 1997, p. 61), participates in parlia-
mentary committees, and is regularly consulted by individual members of parliament and
environmental experts in political parties. It has also acquired a prominent presence in
public fora (Verhulst and Walgrave 2005; Wouters et al. 2011) and membership in several
European environmental associations. In general, environmental interest organizations
are considered one of the most influential social movements of the late twentieth century
(Rootes 2004, p. 608). In many Western European countries, including Belgium, they
emerged in great numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, and gradually evolved into more
professional, formal, and bureaucratized organizations (Jordan and Maloney 1997; van
der Heijden 1997; Diani and Donati 1999). They also established an institutional footprint,
as many contemporary public organizations and advisory bodies nowadays deal with
environmental affairs.
In Belgium, the environmental movement was somewhat different from the emerging
interest organizations in other fields, as it was more formalized and quite successful
in shaping public opinion and influencing the government agenda (Walgrave 1994).
The development of these organizations and the increasing political salience of envi-
ronmental affairs coincided with the process of federalization in Belgium. As various
policy responsibilities, such as environmental issues, were delegated to the subnational
level, new political structures, including a regional ministerial department in charge of
environmental affairs and various specialized regional agencies, needed to be established.
Taking into consideration these societal and political developments, and accounting
for the importance of a visible and well-organized constituency in policy development
(May et al. 2005; Jordan and Halpin 2006; Halpin et al. 2011), the BBL thus provides a rich
case for scrutinizing how evolving resource dependencies between public authorities and
organized interests shape the latter’s development. In order to assess the impact of these
resource dependencies, contextual factors and organizational characteristics should be
analysed through a longitudinal lens. In this regard, leading scholars have argued that the
historical case study is very appropriate for analysing the post-formation development of
interest organizations (Halpin and Jordan 2009, p. 249; Halpin and Nownes 2011, p. 52).
Complementing population ecology studies that focus on clarifying dynamics at the
sectoral level, this approach contributes to a better understanding of organizational
survival and maintenance, and answers the call by Beyers and Kerremans (2007, p. 477) for
more ‘detailed, theory-driven case studies’ that assess the intermediate context and critical
resource dependencies of interest groups. By zooming in on an interest organization’s
development post-formation, this single case study demonstrates how organizations
respond to environmental challenges and accumulate organizational capabilities, and in
this way contributes to theory building (George and Bennett 2005).
After a description of the BBL’s background, three periods in its development will be
discerned on the basis of how its ties with the government evolved. For each of these stages,
the impact these resource dependencies had on its mission, structure, and strategy will be
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scrutinized. The evidence was collected through extensive document analysis of archival
and internal documents (such as yearly reports, annual accounts, press releases, minutes
of internal meetings, and memos), the consultation of secondary sources (Walgrave 1994;
Hooghe 1996; Van Overstraeten 2008), and two in-depth interviews with current BBL staff
in February and June 2011, which both lasted approximately 60 minutes and focused on
the organization’s development, structure, finances, and strategy.
Prologue: the BBL’s origins
As in other industrialized countries, Belgium witnessed a substantial increase in the
number of environmental interest organizations in the early 1970s (Leroy and De Geest
1985; Rootes 2004). The fragmented nature and limited political impact of their activities
(Hooghe 1996) prompted the founding of a national environmental interest organization,
the Bond Beter Leefmilieu/Inter-Environnement (BBL/IE) in 1971. Its mission involved
ensuring continuity in initiatives to preserve the environment, developing policy ideas
and providing logistical support and coordination services to its membership (Walgrave
1994, p. 58). While established at a time when various new social movements emerged,
the BBL/IE was rather atypical, as it was policy rather than protest oriented. For the
leadership, recognition by public authorities and close contact with various societal actors
were as important as support from the broader environmental field (Van Overstraeten
2008). This consensus-oriented nature was also reflected in its mission statement, where
it was advocated that ‘economic growth should be conciliated with a better environment’
(Hooghe 1996, p. 8).
Regarding its structure, it should be emphasized that the BBL/IE did not emerge in a
bottom-up fashion or as a grass-roots social movement. On the contrary, its seven founders
were part of the political and economic establishment and had close contacts with various
companies and business associations, particularly in the energy and financial sectors. Its
financial resources also largely depended on donations from these corporate actors, and
enabled the organization to employ two paid members of staff in addition to a full-time
secretary (Hooghe 1996, p. 8). In order not to lose the backing of these industrial actors, the
BBL/IE’s strategy was consensus-oriented, and its policy positions were rather moderate.
Its policy portfolio consisted of three clusters (in declining degree of importance): nature
preservation, spatial planning, and environmental degradation (Hooghe 1996). This rank
order mirrored the background of its 38 member organizations, as nature preservation
organizations were the most numerous.
In the years that followed the initial founding, the BBL/IE faced severe financial
difficulties which accelerated the ongoing federalization process within the national
association (Hooghe 1996, p. 9; Bursens 1997). As a result of the organization’s increasingly
critical position on nuclear energy, several important contributors (notably the energy
industry) withdrew their support (Van Overstraeten 2008). In 1979, the national umbrella
association, a fairly formalized and layered organization consisting of four decentralized
regional entities, was disbanded. Next to financial woes, divergence on strategic matters
(with the Flemish leadership preferring more political involvement) and communication
difficulties caused by language differences, spurred this dissolution (Hooghe 1996).
Still, its timing remains remarkable, considering that at that time the national govern-
ment still dealt with most environmental affairs. It was only after the state reforms of
1980 and particularly 1988 that the national government transferred its environmental
competencies to the regional governments. For BBL Flanders (BBL hereafter), the impact
of this devolution process remained limited, as the Flemish branch of the BBL/IE already
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functioned as an autonomous entity. While the national umbrella (BBL/IE) no longer
exists, the BBL’s development in the following years demonstrates the relevance of its
legacy and confirms the long-lasting effect of initial choices regarding structures and
strategy (Truman 1951, p. 66; Stinchcombe 1965; Edwards and McCarthy 2004, p. 136).
Peripheral relations with government and the quest for survival (1976–88)
During this period, the issue of nuclear energy prompted a radicalization of the
broader environmental movement. Some of the more activist member organizations
regarded the BBL as too consensus oriented and urged the leadership to take a more
confrontational stance. These demands, however, largely fell on deaf ears, as the lead-
ership considered a very militant attitude to be incompatible with the BBL’s mission
as a policy-oriented and consensus-seeking peak association. It was also regarded as
potentially detrimental to the organization’s relations with public authorities, which
had recently been strengthened. While the organization had previously enjoyed no
structural ties to policymakers, in the 1980s it participated in a small number of
advisory councils.
Most of the BBL’s structure remained quite stable during this period. The organization
faced great uncertainty about its future and relied on fairly limited resources, as its main
source of funding comprised limited annual grants from the Flemish Ministry of Culture.
Consequently, the BBL’s staff – which consisted of two or three permanently employed
people, complemented by volunteers and temporary workers – was primarily focused
on ensuring the survival of the organization. In a strategic memo from 1984 (BBL), the
leadership wondered whether ‘(we) are not too occupied with internal problems, in that
way losing touch with our constituency?’ At that time, rather than lobbying success or
membership involvement, organizational survival represented the BBL’s main concern
(see also Salisbury 1969; Lowery 2007).
Although most structural features remained similar during this period, the BBL’s
membership changed considerably in this period, which affected its strategy. Whereas
in the 1970s conservation organizations, which often administrated large nature pat-
rimonies and employed several people, were most numerous, smaller environmental
action organizations focusing on specific issues regarding environmental degradation
had become the dominant faction (Walgrave 1994). As a result, topics like pollution and
waste management gained a more prominent place in the organization’s portfolio, and
the staff developed a more assertive and proactive attitude. Furthermore, despite its
limited organizational capacity, the BBL was (albeit indirectly) engaged in various protest
activities during the 1980s, which would have been unthinkable ten years earlier. They
supported events and campaigns of local groups, for instance, by providing logistical
services, building coalitions, and presenting their concerns to policymakers. The BBL was
in this way able to tackle a wide range of issues. In the years that followed, this tactic of
ad hoc cooperation with regional organizations would be applied frequently.
In addition, the BBL managed to grow in other aspects, broadening its interorganiza-
tional network by establishing closer contacts with political parties and other organized
interests. Regarding the former, the organization emphasized its political neutrality, as
it preferred access to all political actors over privileged relations with the Green Party,
which had been established in 1979. Existing relations with other societal actors were
strengthened and institutionalized, resulting in the establishment of non-profit networks
such as Labour and Environment (Arbeid en Milieu, consisting of the BBL and labour
unions) and Komimo (a platform of eight NGOs working on sustainable mobility).
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Strengthening ties with public authorities: a burdensome affair (1988–98)
With regard to fostering closer relations with public authorities, important progress was
made by the BBL in the late 1980s. As a result of political considerations and growing
pressure from the environmental field, several environmental interest organizations
became more closely involved in policymaking. Whereas in 1983, the BBL only participated
in three Flemish advisory councils, its formal representation in governmental bodies
increased significantly in the years that followed (Hooghe 1996, p. 22). This trend was
welcomed by the BBL’s leadership, as an increase in its policy impact through the
establishment of more formal concertation structures represented a core component of
its strategy. This shift was also embraced by policymakers who sought to develop new
structures and policy initiatives in the environmental domain, including the (advisory)
involvement of organized interests in policy preparation, though not establishing neo-
corporatist policymaking patterns (Bursens 1997, p. 62).
The devolution of power from the federal government to the Belgian regions in 1988
played an important part here, as most environmental policymaking competences were
then delegated to the subnational (Flemish) level. A landmark in this regard was a
specific legislative act, the so-called 1991 MiNa-Decree on ‘the establishment of a Flemish
Council on Environmental and Conservation Affairs and the resolution of the general rules
concerning the legitimation and subsidization of environmental groups’. This represented
the start of a comprehensive environmental policy at the subnational level (Ongena 2010).
With the establishment of this advisory council (the MiNa-Council hereafter), which
included key environmental stakeholders as well as more traditional economic interests
such as labour unions and employer associations, the Flemish government aimed to
increase the legitimacy of its environmental policy (Walgrave 1997; see also May et al.
2005; Jordan and Halpin 2006; Halpin et al. 2011).
Another objective of the MiNa-Decree involved better financial support of environmen-
tal interest organizations. In addition to official recognition by the Flemish government
and a strong representation in the MiNa-Council (occupying six of the 24 seats), the BBL
now was also entitled to structural government funding based on legally specified criteria
related to the number of staff, membership figures, and activities (Vlaamse Executieve
1992).
The closer integration of the BBL into policy circles, which was demonstrated by the
more frequent contact with various political parties and members of government, had
a strong impact on the structure of the organization. The BBL was able to employ four
additional people, increasing its organizational capacity. Another indirect consequence
was that, for the first time in its history, the BBL actively started recruiting new members
in order to improve its representativeness. From 1976 to 1981, its membership had grown
from 26 to 49 environmental interest organizations. During the 1980s, these numbers had
remained rather stable. However, due to a loosening of membership conditions and a
recruitment campaign, the number of affiliated organizations soared in the early 1990s,
as is shown in table 1. In 1996, the BBL’s membership amounted to 118 environmental
organizations. Although the organization has managed to further increase its membership
base since then (counting 147 members nowadays), it has never again experienced such
an impressive growth rate in such a short period of time (4 years). Although this
development can be linked to a willingness to strengthen the organization’s identity
as a representative peak organization as well as a greater appeal to potential members
because of its strengthened relations with policymakers, it should be noted that additional
membership organizations also implied supplementary public funding.
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TABLE 1 BBL: membership and staff 1981–2008
1981 1989 2000 2005 2008
Membership 49 56 120 140 146
Staff (total) 5 10 13 35 41
Staff (FTE) 11.95 28.5 33.1
The BBL now enjoyed direct access to policymakers, implying an increase in its agenda-
setting powers. In a strategic memo from 1990, the BBL confirmed the policy-oriented
mission of the organization, as it continued to prioritize close cooperation with public
authorities, the accumulation of expertise on environmental affairs, and the establishment
of coalitions with a wide range of actors, interest organizations as well as companies
(BBL 1990). This document also stresses the need to attenuate the ‘oligarchic character’
of the organization, caused by weak relations with membership organizations and their
limited participation in organizational decision-making (due to their lack of financial and
personnel resources). A closer involvement of their constituency, however, proved hard
to realize. While in terms of reputation and government access the BBL’s situation had
surely improved, this increase in (partly mandatory) duties absorbed most attention and
resources.
Maintaining relations with government actors also became increasingly important
to the organization and started to occupy most of the staff’s time (see also Walgrave
1997; Froelich 1999). Moreover, while the specialized and technical nature of the issues
discussed in the Mina-Raad required extensive study and preparation by the BBL’s staff,
this kind of work was of limited relevance to their constituency (Hooghe 1996, p. 24). The
greater recognition by the Flemish government as a representative peak association also
implied that the organization had to fulfil a number of additional tasks, such as setting
up activities across Flanders, issuing a quarterly environmental magazine, organizing at
least ten educational activities annually, and assembling its governing bodies no less than
ten times a year (Vlaamse Executieve 1992). Hence, while its monetary resources had
increased considerably, they were insufficient to execute these various assignments. To
acquire additional financial means, the BBL started to develop various projects, expanding
its cooperation with a number of companies like Procter & Gamble and Douwe Egberts,
as well as with institutional actors such as provincial and local governments (BBL 1996).
Consolidating the status of core policy insider: organizational expansion,
professionalization, and diversification (1998–2010)
During the last decade, the BBL’s development accelerated, especially between 2000 and
2004. The organization further consolidated its position as policy insider. As a result
of increasing government subsidies, its structure changed considerably. The organization
was able to strengthen its organizational autonomy by significantly increasing the number
of staff (see table 1).
Regarding interaction with its membership organizations, which represents an enduring
concern of the organization’s staff, increased efforts were made to inform and support
local groups as well as to involve them in BBL’s policy-making activities (BBL 2005, 2009).
Table 2 illustrates that the BBL also diversified its sources of income by successfully
applying for European funding. While until 2005 the organization did not rely on EU
funding, nowadays subsidies from this level represent more than 7 per cent of its total
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TABLE 2 BBL: diversity resource supply 1980–2008
1980 1991 2000 2005 2008
Budget 125,000 203,125 1,140,300 2,449,815 2,950,000
Private funding 33.30% 21.80% 8.59% 11.38%
Public funding 66.70% 78.20% 91.41% 88.62%
Domestic 66.70% 78.20% 91.24% 81.42%
EU 0.00% 0.00% 0.17% 7.20%
budget. By diversifying their resource supply, they managed to decrease their financial
dependence on funding from the Flemish government. Whereas this channel represented
more than 70 per cent of all public funding in 2005, in 2008 its proportion was reduced
to about 54 per cent. Yet, at the same time, the evolution of BBL’s resource supply
also demonstrates the limitations of strategic preferences. For instance, already in 1990,
internal documents stressed that the BBL was seeking to diversify its resource supply in
order to decrease its reliance on public funding (BBL 1990). Yet, 15 years later, public
subsidies (although being more diversified across different levels of government) still
accounted for more than 90 per cent of its budget, an increase of about 25 per cent. This
evolution demonstrates the path dependent nature of organizational development, and
resonates with earlier work finding that interest organizations whose establishment was
highly dependent on patrons often remain greatly reliant on this form of financial support
(Walker 1991).
The organizational growth of the BBL coincided with the formation of a denser and
more diverse interorganizational network, a substantial increase in its representation
on domestic advisory councils, and the establishment of closer links with various EU
associations (especially between 2000 and 2005). With regard to issue prioritization,
another vital component of the organization’s strategy, the evolution of its policy portfolio
over the last ten years is provided in figure 1. The figure compares the diversity of
the organization’s press releases in 2000 (n=34) and 2010 (n=49), applying the coding
scheme of the Policy Agendas Project Codebook. While the organization has maintained
a generalist orientation, in line with its original mission, its policy focus has clearly
evolved over time, which demonstrates the greater flexibility of strategic features. As
the constituency of the organization changed during the 1970s and 1980s, issues related
to environmental degradation became more prominent than topics concerning nature
conservation.
Figure 1 shows that in 2000 the BBL focused mainly on environmental, (local) public land
management, and transportation issues. Over the last ten years, however, its portfolio has
(once again) changed considerably. While maintaining its generalist character, nowadays
the organization is clearly more attentive to issues such as finance, international affairs,
and (especially) sustainable development (particularly with regard to energy).
The portfolio of the BBL has thus increased and diversified considerably since its foun-
dation (Hooghe 1996, pp. 30–33). This can be related to the development of organizational
capabilities over time, and the fact that its inclusion in various advisory councils required
the organization to broaden its expertise and to closely monitor the political agenda. Yet
it was also an explicit choice, as the organization sought to realize its mission by tackling
each issue that could be linked with environmental concerns, thus confirming its status
as a representative peak association and consolidating its position as a key policy insider.
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FIGURE 1 BBL policy portfolio evolution 2000, 2010
Synthesis: resource dependencies and the hierarchy of change
We expected the organizational development of interest organizations to be shaped by
their evolving resource dependencies on public authorities. The trajectory of the BBL was
not one of gradual organizational growth. Rather, for a long time, organizational survival
was a key concern of its leadership. During this period, the configuration of the BBL
was marked by stability rather than change. Actually, its organizational development
only took off in 1990 when its relationship with the Flemish public authorities changed
considerably. It was only then that significant organizational growth was realized (that is,
when the number of staff and the amount of financial resources increased substantially).
However, the most fundamental changes in the organization only came about ten years
later. The integration of the BBL in to policy circles implied that the organization had
to fulfil several additional tasks, which occupied most of the organization’s budget and
forced it to look for additional resources. It was only once the BBL had become acquainted
with these new functions and had increased its financial leverage that its development
accelerated.
We furthermore assumed that not all organizational features would be equally affected
by the evolving relations with the state. As was demonstrated above, the BBL’s mission
has remained quite stable over time. Its founders aimed for a policy-focused, knowledge-
oriented and state-directed interest organization which could also support the broader
environmental movement. The peak function of the organization was considered a crucial
component of its mission from the start. Today, the BBL still is a policy- and state-oriented
environmental peak association, confirming Truman’s view that ‘the origins of interest
groups and the circumstances surrounding their orientations towards the institutions of
government [are] . . . among the factors most relevant to a description of group politics’
(Truman 1951, p. 66).
Considering crucial components of its structure, such as its membership, staff, and
financial figures, important changes clearly did materialize as the BBL’s ties to public
authorities intensified, although these changes did not take place immediately after
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the organization became a policy insider. The organization’s strategy was conceived as
most malleable, and this expectation was confirmed by the flexible nature of the BBL’s
policy portfolio, which was also affected by changes in its membership. Regarding its
interorganizational network, more continuity was observed, with a gradual strengthening
of relations with organizations that were allies of the BBL from the very beginning, such
as labour unions, and also with some business associations and companies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Scholars studying the interaction between the state and organized interests usually
focus on the strategic implications of this interplay. In this article, I proposed that
these ties can have a substantial influence on an organization’s development, although
not all organizational features were hypothesized to be equally affected by evolving
resource dependencies. The case study of the BBL provided an empirical examination
of this argument. While the BBL’s mission remained identical over time, elements of its
structure and strategy, such as its membership, resources, and issue portfolio, changed
considerably as its linkages with public authorities intensified. One limitation of the case
study is that, by specifically highlighting the interaction between organized interests
and public authorities, other aspects, such as the interaction between the organization’s
leadership, membership organizations, and the broader interest community, remain
somewhat underexposed (Rothenberg 1992; Soule and King 2008; Young 2010). Still,
the observations about the BBL are typical for various membership organizations facing
similar conditions, that is, for encompassing interest organizations that seek an insider
status and are highly dependent on government support for their survival (Clemens 1997;
Minkoff 1999).
Rather than the interplay between constituency and staff, relations with public author-
ities were found to be critical to organizational development. Hence, similar to the
evolutionary development of political parties, the evolutionary development of orga-
nized interests should not only be linked to changes in civil society, it should also be
related to their dynamic interaction with public authorities. As political parties became
increasingly intertwined with the state and evolved from elite parties to cartel parties,
their resource base, party work, method of campaigning, and membership base altered
considerably (Katz and Mair 1995, pp. 6, 20). Katz and Mair note that, especially in
corporatist systems, large and established economic organizations have developed sim-
ilarly strong ties with the state (p. 23). However, their observation is accurate not only
for economic interest organizations, as other types of organized interests have acquired
rather similar positions or aim for a similar status; nor is their observation only accurate
for corporatist countries, as patronage also plays a key role in more pluralist polities
(Walker 1991; Maloney 2012).
Support from policymakers can enhance the development of structural and strategic
capabilities of interest organizations, enabling them to accumulate human and financial
capital, as well as allowing them to broaden and intensify their interorganizational net-
works. In this view, government patronage allows for the development of a constituency
that might otherwise not be heard. Nonetheless, although policymakers prefer to interact
with societal actors that are both knowledgeable and legitimate representatives of a
specific constituency, the way they steer the development of organized interests (by tying
financial support to specific organizational features and activities) appears not always to
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be optimally aligned with this objective. In other words, these resource dependencies also
have their drawbacks.
The status of a policy insider often implies additional tasks, which might not be fully
consistent with an organization’s mission (Hager et al. 2004; Walker and McCarthy 2010;
Maloney 2012). These bureaucratization pressures are particularly strong in the first years
that an organization receives government funding (Staggenborg 1988; Stone et al. 2001),
and can cause it to ‘gravitate’ towards the state, focusing primarily on creating a positive
image among policymakers, and possibly losing touch with its members and the broader
civil society (see also Mosley 2012). Therefore, interest organizations need to carefully
manage these dependencies, and regularly assess whether the evolution of their structural
and strategic features still effectively supports their original mission.
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